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I. INTRODUCTION 
The past few years have been all but revolutionary for Myanmar. 
In 2010, the country held its first elections after decades of rule by a 
military junta. Shortly thereafter, Nobel Peace Prize recipient and 
leader of the National League for Democracy (“NLD”), Aung San 
Suu Kyi, was released from house arrest after fifteen years. In 2012, 
she won a seat in the country’s parliament, and at the World 
Economic Forum in Nay Pyi Taw in 2013, she announced her 
interest in running for office of President of Myanmar.1 But in spite 
of its progress, Myanmar is still a country best known for its 
bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption. In 2012, it ranked 172 out 
of 183 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index.2 After decades of junta rule, the military still 
influences all sectors of the economy and government; furthermore, 
according to analysts, strong links exist between the ruling elite and 
organized crime.3 The 2010 and 2012 elections, while milestone 
events, were reportedly mired in fraud and irregularities.4 According 
 
 1. Aung San Suu Kyi, Statement to Nik Gowing of BBC News at the World 
Economic Forum for East Asia (June 6, 2012).  
 2. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2013). 
 3. Overview of Corruption in Burma (Myanmar), ANTI-CORRUPTION 
RESOURCE CENTRE (2012), http://issuu.com/cmi-norway/docs/349/7?e=1246952/ 
2680739 (noting the prevalence of trafficking in narcotics, people, wildlife, gems, 
and timber, and alleging that “[c]ollusion between traffickers and Burma’s ruling 
military junta . . . allows organised crime to function with virtual impunity”).  
 4. See id. at 3 (pointing to independent candidates’ reports of harassment and 
restrictions placed on opposition political parties such as high registration fees, 
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to skeptics, cronyism and illegal payments to bureaucrats are still the 
way business gets done in Myanmar. Compounding the problem, 
nascent democratic institutions lack the strength and system of 
checks and balances to effectively curb corruption or expel corrupt 
officials.5 
The new reformist government, elected in 2010 and led by Thein 
Sein (a former member of the military junta), has vowed to tackle 
corruption as an impediment to the fledgling democracy’s growth 
and development. The military junta primarily employed corruption 
charges to eliminate political threats,6 but the new government has 
recently initiated seemingly legitimate corruption investigations. In 
January 2013, Myanmar charged Thein Tun, a former 
telecommunications minister, and dozens of other government 
officials as part of an investigation into corruption in the country’s 
telecommunications industry; Thein Tun was placed under house 
arrest.7 According to reports, the telecommunications industry in 
Myanmar is particularly corrupt—with SIM cards costing 
approximately $250, versus just $1.50 in neighboring countries,8 and 
with pre-paid SIM cards often unable to be re-charged.9 
 
denied access to the state media, and constrained elections monitoring).  
 5. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, supra note 2 (remarking that, in 
lieu of checks and balances, the institutions that Myanmar has in place to stave off 
corruption appear to be outdated and undeveloped, making them more likely to be 
improperly taken advantage of for political gain).  
 6. Embassy Rangoon, Cable 04RANGOON1462, The Burmese Regime Airs 
Its Dirty Laundry: Former PM “Corrupt and Insubordinate” (Nov. 12, 2004), 
available at http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=04RANGOON1462 
(opining that the military regime charged former prime minister Khin Nyunt with 
corruption as an excuse to remove him based on a long-standing hatred and fear 
associated with a military intelligence apparatus that knew no limits and focused 
attention not only on overt threats to the status quo, but also on the regime itself). 
 7. Aung Hla Tun, Myanmar Launches Major Graft Probe at Telecoms 
Ministry, REUTERS, Jan. 24 2013, available at uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid= 
UKL4N0AT29I20130124 (reporting that this major investigation of government 
officials and workers came one month after President Thein Sein vowed to clean 
up corruption and that it is part of an effort that freed hundreds of political 
prisoners, relaxed censorship laws, and helped hold free elections).  
 8. See id. at 1 (noting that these prices are some of the world’s most 
expensive).  
 9. See Ko Tha Dja, SIM Card Corruption in Burma Stalls Progress, 
DISSIDENT VOICE (Sept. 23, 2013), http://dissidentvoice.org/2013/09/sim-card-
corruption-in-burma-stalls-progress/ (detailing low-level corruption in the 
Myanmar telecommunications market and explaining that certain SIM cards must 
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In January 2013, the government also formed an anti-corruption 
committee,10 and in June 2013, a two-day workshop was held in Nay 
Phi Taw to discuss rewriting the country’s antiquated Suppression of 
Corruption Act of 1948.11 A statement from the Home Ministry 
called for public participation in the elimination of corruption.12 
Public participation to end corruption may be a tall order in a 
country where the per capita GDP (adjusted for purchasing power 
parity) in 2012 was just $1,400 (203 out of 229 in the world).13 
Poverty is undoubtedly linked to corruption in Myanmar, and the 
new government may have a difficult time convincing its struggling 
people that the fight against corruption is worth their time. The 
Dodd-Frank Act, recently passed in the United States could prove 
instructive to Myanmar’s government as it attempts to shift public 
attitudes surrounding corruption. 
A. GLOBAL IMPACT OF CORRUPTION 
Corruption is a global problem. The World Bank estimates $20–
$40 billion are stolen in and from developing countries every year.14 
The lives of Mu’ammar Qadhafi, Charles Taylor, Slobodan 
Milosevic, and Sani Abacha are high-profile examples of the toll that 
global corruption exacts on the developing world, but lower-profile 
 
be activated within fourteen days of purchase or the user must pay a fee to unlock 
the card).  
 10. See Myanmar Establishes Anti-Corruption Committee, THE NATION, Jan. 9, 
2013, http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Myanmar-establishes-anti-
corruption-committee-30197566.html (quoting President Thein Sein’s announcing, 
“As part of efforts for the emergence of good governance and clean government 
after the new government took office, an action committee against corruption is 
formed to fight the corruption and bribery in governmental organisations”). 
 11. See Myanmar Holds Workshop on Drafting Anti-Corruption Bill, GLOBAL 
TIMES (July 30, 2013), www.globaltimes.cn/content/792582.shtml#.UlnGjFCko_A 
(reporting that the workshop focused on parliament’s obligations under the U.N. 
Convention Against Corruption).  
 12. See id. at 1 (stating that the Home Ministry believes that clean government 
can be achieved with the help of public participation and that citizens should report 
bribery cases to the Bureau of Special Investigation and Head Office of the Home 
Ministry).  
 13. Burma, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK (Sept. 10, 2013), https://www.cia.g 
ov/library/publications /the-world- factbook/geos /bm.html.  
 14. Stolen Assets and Development, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE, 
www1.worldbank.org/finance/star_site/stolen-assets.html (last visited Feb. 7, 
2013). 
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examples—e.g., bribery of local police and bridges that are never 
built (or are built poorly)—exact just as high a toll and may be 
harder to root out. Until now, most of the work fighting global 
corruption and recovering stolen assets has been the work of 
government agencies and intergovernmental organizations.15 
B. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION 
The U.N. Convention Against Corruption obliges signatory 
governments to return illicit assets to their rightful owners.16 
Governments often work together to find, freeze, and return assets 
stolen by corrupt officials.17 The World Bank and the U.N. Office of 
Drugs and Crime have also partnered to create the Stolen Asset 
Recovery Initiative (“StAR”) which works with developing countries 
and financial centers to prevent money laundering and to help trace 
and recover the proceeds of grand corruption.18 Many countries also 
have their own bribery laws aimed at national and multinational 
corporations within their borders. 
C. AMERICAN EFFORTS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION: DODD-FRANK 
In 2010, the United States passed a novel law that could 
permanently change the landscape of the fight against global 
corruption by enlisting the services of private individuals: the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”).19 Though it made headlines throughout the United States 
when it passed, few news outlets highlighted what may become a 
lasting legacy of the law: democratizing the fight against corruption. 
Buried in Dodd-Frank is language amending the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (“FCPA”) – the United States’ version of anti-bribery 
 
 15. See, e.g., Anti-Corruption Links, ACT AGAINST CORRUPTION, 
www.actagainstcorruption.org/actagainstcorruption/en/resources/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2013).  
 16. U.N. Convention Against Corruption arts. 51, 57, Oct. 31, 2003, G.A. Res. 
58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4.  
 17. E.g., Mark V. Vlasic & Gregory Cooper, Fast Cash: Recovering Stolen 
Assets, AMERICAS Q. (2010), available at http://www.americasquarterly.org/ 
node/1901 (detailing cooperation between Swiss, Haitian, and StAR officials in 
recovering assets that former Haitian president Jean-Claude Duvalier had stolen). 
 18. Stolen Assets and Development, supra note 14. 
 19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 
5301 (2010). 
  
446 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:2 
legislation—awarding whistleblowers potentially millions of dollars 
for tipping off the U.S. government to corruption by and bribery of 
foreign officials.20 
For centuries, under the Alien Tort Statute, the United States has 
provided aliens with the right to be compensated for violations of 
international law.21 Now, under the FCPA, private citizens will also 
have the right to be compensated for helping stop corruption. In 
other words, for the first time, private citizens will have a stake in—
and an avenue for reaching—the global fight against corruption. 
This paper will argue that, through the Dodd-Frank amendments to 
the FCPA, the United States has provided a possible model legal 
framework—including for countries like Myanmar—for expanding 
state resources in the fight against global corruption by solving the 
collective action problem and incentivizing individual participation 
in a realm that has traditionally been the exclusive purview of state 
actors. Part II will discuss the state of global corruption in 2012 and 
the U.S. legal framework for fighting that corruption. Part III will 
argue that information inequalities and opportunity costs have 
hampered efforts to fight international impunity. Dodd-Frank seeks 
to mitigate both of these problems by solving the collective action 
problem and enlisting the support of private actors. Part III will also 
briefly discuss how solving the collective action problem has 
adjusted the balance of interests under the public choice theory and 
why governmental discretion is imperative to the success of the new 
U.S. model framework. We conclude by arguing that the 
Government in Myanmar could find the Dodd-Frank anti-corruption 
framework to be a useful model for deputizing citizens in the fight 
against corruption. 
 
 20. FCPA: A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 
guide.pdf [hereinafter Resource Guide to the FCPA] (noting that Dodd-Frank 
added Section 21F to the Exchange Act to authorize the SEC to provide monetary 
awards to certain eligible whistleblowing individuals).  
 21. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789).  
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II. FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF GLOBAL CORRUPTION 
The worst corruption often occurs in political parties, the 
bureaucracy, and the legislature,22 but petty corruption, or bribery, is 
perhaps the most prevalent. One in four people worldwide report 
having paid a bribe, most often to police and most often to avoid 
trouble with authorities or to “speed things up.”23 Bribery is the most 
widespread in Sub-Saharan Africa, where over half of individuals 
report having paid a bribe.24 
Furthermore, corruption is not going away in the twenty-first 
century. Over half of respondents to a 2010 survey thought that 
corruption had increased over the past three years, with the greatest 
increases coming from the European Union (seventy-three percent of 
respondents believe that corruption increased) and North American 
countries (sixty-seven percent).25 In 2011, Transparency International 
found that highly corrupt countries—of which there were more than 
sixty—outnumbered the countries mostly free from corruption.26 
Myanmar, considered by some as one of those highly corrupt 
countries, ranked 180 out of the 183 countries and territories 
surveyed by Transparency International in 2011 and received a score 
of 1.5 out of 10.0 on the Corruption Perceptions Index.27 The 
 
 22. See  uanita Ria o et al., Global Corruption Barometer 2010, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L 8–9 (2010), http://www.transparency.de/fileadmin/pdfs/ 
Wissen/Korruptionsindices/GCB_2010.pdf (using survey responses to show an 
overwhelming global perception that political parties are most corrupt, closely 
followed by public servants, parliaments, and the police).  
 23. Id. at 12–13, 19 (examining responses of 77,000 users of nine basic 
services—customs, education, the judiciary, land-related services, medical 
services, the police, registry and permit services, tax authorities, and utilities, and 
finding one out of four respondents have paid a bribe in the past year).  
 24. See id. at 16–17 (finding that fifty-six percent of users of the nine basic 
services in Sub-Saharan Africa admit to having paid a bribe to a service provider).  
 25. See id. at 5 (noting that while corruption may have increased most in 
Western Europe and the United States, corruption is also expanding globally, with 
forty-five percent of respondents believing that corruption had increased in Russia 
and the former Soviet Union, and fifty-seven percent of respondents believing 
corruption had increased in the Middle East and North Africa).  
 26. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, supra note 2, at 4.  
 27. Id. 
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country’s porous border and lack of effective anti-corruption 
institutions have made Myanmar a prime target for trafficking in 
narcotics, people, wildlife, and other contraband. In 2006, the World 
Bank estimated that illegal logging harvest rates in Myanmar could 
exceed legal harvest rates by as much as eighty percent, and joint 
ventures between foreign and state-owned oil and gas firms, which 
are mandated by domestic law, lack transparency and accountability. 
Moreover, Myanmar is the primary source for amphetamine-type 
stimulants in Asia, and, according to U.S. Department of State’s 
estimates, several thousand citizens of Myanmar are victims of 
human trafficking each year—both internal and international 
trafficking.28 Citizens of highly corrupt countries often believe 
government efforts to fight corruption are ineffective. Despite the 
increase in corruption and these perceptions of ineffectiveness, 
people still believe the media and governments are crucial to fighting 
global corruption.29 Consequently, many countries and regions have 
begun building anti-corruption coalitions and transparency 
initiatives. The United States, in part out of a concern that its 
businesses might be left behind in unfair competitions, has been a 
major driving force in building these coalitions and initiatives. 
In 1996, members of the Organization of American States 
(“OAS”) adopted the Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption, which commits its members to standardize their criminal 
anti-corruption laws.30 Then, in 1997, the Council of Europe’s 
Committee of Ministers adopted twenty guiding principles for 
compliance with the Council’s various anti-corruption conventions.31 
Eleven African countries have adopted twenty-five anti-corruption 
 
 28. See generally Marie Chene, Overview of corruption in Burma (Myanmar), 
U4 HELPDESK, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-in-burma-myanmar/. 
 29. See Ria o et al., supra note 22, at 24–26 (highlighting survey results that 
reflect that the general public would most trust the media as the one institution 
most likely to stop corruption).  
 30. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption art. 2, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 
I.L.M. 724 (focusing on the need to “promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation 
among State Parties . . . to eradicate corruption in the performance of public 
functions”).  
 31. On the Twenty Guiding Principles for the Fight Against Corruption, 
COUNCIL OF EUR. COMM. OF MINISTERS (Nov. 6, 1997), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/documents/Resolution(97)24_EN.pdf.  
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principles as part of the Global Coalition for Africa.32 And in Asia, 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation promotes government 
transparency and accountability reforms to create better investment 
climates.33 Moreover, thirty-nine countries have signed the 
Organization for Economic and Cultural Development’s (“OECD”) 
Convention, which requires each country to enact strong anti-
corruption legislation.34 
International organizations have also been active in the fight 
against global corruption. The U.N., the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) have stated that corruption 
impedes economic growth and have established units to help fight 
corruption.35 
B. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
In 1977, the United States enacted the FCPA to counteract corrupt 
behavior by American companies after a Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) investigation revealed illegal foreign payments 
made by over 400 companies totaling over $300 million.36 Despite 
Congress’ enactment of the FCPA, corruption skyrocketed by the 
 
 32. Fighting Global Corruption: Business Risk Management, U.S. DEP’T ST. 
14 (2003), http://cdm16064.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p266901coll4/ 
id/2484 [hereinafter Fighting Global Corruption].  
 33. APEC Course of Action on Fighting Corruption and Ensuring 
Transparency, ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (Nov. 17–18, 2004), 
available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-
and-Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/~/media/Files/Groups/ACT/04_ 
amm_033rev2.ashx. 
 34. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 20 November 
2012, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconventionratification.pdf. 
 35. Fighting Global Corruption, supra note 32, at 16 (noting that the World 
Bank and the IMF have declared that corruption must be addressed in the context 
of economic and financial evaluations and assistance programs to combat its 
deterrent effects). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1998); Resource Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20, 
at 3 (citing U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 94TH CONG., REP. OF THE SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 
2–3 (1976), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/sec-report-
questionable-illegal-corporate-payments-practices-1976.pdf) (explaining that 
companies falsified corporate financial records to hide illegal payments made to 
U.S. political campaigns and to foreign officials abroad from secret “slush funds”). 
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early 2000s: between 1994 and 2001, foreign firms from fifty 
countries allegedly paid bribes in over 400 international contract 
biddings.37 Though the pace of corruption has not slowed, the FCPA 
has played an increasingly important role in deterring corrupt 
conduct. In recent years, single cases have yielded penalties of 
hundreds of millions of dollars.38 
The FCPA makes it unlawful for any U.S. person—natural person, 
juridical person, or one acting on their behalf—to bribe a foreign 
official (or candidate for office) to obtain or retain business.39 The 
statute is written broadly so most people and companies with some 
connection to the United States, including foreign firms who act in 
furtherance of a corrupt payment while in the United States, fall 
within its scope.40 This “Business Purpose Test” is interpreted 
broadly to apply even when the business being obtained or retained 
is not associated directly with a foreign government.41 
The Act exempts payments made to facilitate, expedite, or secure 
the performance of routine government action—such as expediting 
the processing of visas or permits, or obtaining police protection or 
phone services.42 It also provides several affirmative defenses, 
including (1) that the action was lawful under the laws of the country 
in which it was performed, despite how highly unlikely it is that any 
other country’s laws permit bribery, or (2) the action involved a bona 
fide expenditure.43 
The U.S. Department of  ustice (“DO ”) and the SEC are charged 
 
 37. Fighting Global Corruption, supra note 32, at 3 (noting that bribing firms 
were competing for contracts valued at a total of $200 billion). 
 38. Mike Koehler, FCPA 101, How Are FCPA Fines, Penalties, and Sentences 
Calculated?, FCPA PROFESSOR (2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-
101#q17 (setting forth the largest corporate FCPA settlements); see, e.g., Resource 
Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20, at 22 (highlighting the FCPA’s explicit 
prohibition on payments made through third parties and pointing to a prosecution 
of four multi-national corporations, which relied on third parties to bribe Nigerian 
officials, that resulted in $1.7 billion in civil and criminal sanctions).  
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).  
 40. Resource Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20, at 10. 
 41. Id. at 12.  
 42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), (f)(3).  
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c) (defining bona fide expenditures as including travel 
and lodging payments either related generally to the promotion of products or 
services, or related to the execution or performance of a contract with the foreign 
government).  
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with and effectively carry out enforcement of the FCPA. Penalties 
for violating the FCPA bribery and accounting provisions are heavy 
and are generally increased for willful violations.44 Corporate 
violators may be suspended or debarred from competing in the 
federal procurement process and may face heavy criminal fines, up 
to $2 million, for each violation.45 Individual violators, on the other 
hand, may face criminal fines of up to $100,000 or five years in 
prison.46 Additionally, the government can bring a civil suit for up to 
$10,000 per violation by both individuals and corporations.47 
Moreover, the Alternative Fines Act can increase penalties to twice 
the pecuniary benefit sought by violating the Act. The Act also 
allows courts, at their discretion, to impose additional fines equaling 
or exceeding the defendant’s pecuniary gain.48 
No private cause of action exists under the FCPA, but violations of 
the Act may also fall within the scope of federal racketeering laws, 
which do have private causes of action.49 Corrupt behaviors also 
include violations of U.S. mail and wire fraud statutes, the Travel 
Act, or state bribery statutes.50 
C. THE DODD-FRANK FINANCIAL REFORM LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATIONS 
In July 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which mandates a 
series of financial regulatory reforms, intended to prevent a 
recurrence of an event like the “Great Recession” of 2008–2009.51 
Section 92252 of Dodd-Frank amended the FCPA by adding 
 
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff.  
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(A).  
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(2)(A).  
 47. Id.; Resource Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20, at 69. 
 48. Resource Guide to the FCPA, supra note 20, at 68. 
 49. Id. at 48. 
 50. Id. at 48–49. 
 51. 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (“An act to promote the financial stability of the United 
States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end 
‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”).  
 52. See id. §§ 748, 922 (Section 922 amends the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, applies specifically to corruption in the securities industry, and is most likely 
to be used in FCPA actions; Section 748, on the other hand, amends the 
Commodities Exchange Act to provide the same whistleblowing incentives as 
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monetary incentives to encourage individuals to report bribery of 
foreign officials.53 If an individual54 voluntarily provides the 
government with original information about a violation of the FCPA, 
and if that information leads to monetary sanctions of $1 million or 
more,55 then the individual shall be awarded ten to thirty percent of 
the sanctions.56 The SEC has complete discretion to determine the 
amount awarded and will consider, among other things, the 
significance of the information, the degree of assistance it provided, 
and the government’s interest in deterring future violations to make 
its determination.57 However, no award will be given to individuals 
who knowingly and willfully provide false information.58 
Sensitive to fears of retaliation against those who report abuses by 
their companies, the legislation also strengthens the whistleblower 
protections in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200259 and allows for 
anonymous reporting.60 If an individual wishes, he can anonymously 
 
Section 922). 
 53. See generally id. § 922. 
 54. See id. (noting that the legislation and ensuing regulations place some 
restrictions on which individual can receive an award for reporting FCPA 
violations, while the largest category of restrictions is on individuals who obtained 
the original information through an internal investigation they were legally 
obligated to conduct; the legislation also bars employees of certain governmental 
agencies and self-regulatory organizations from receiving awards under the new 
FCPA framework); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2) (2006) (defining the type of action the 
Commission will take, pursuant to securities laws, in response to monetary 
sanctions of $1 million or more). 
 55. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (stating that the statutory language includes 
judgments, settlements, and other forms of sanctions, thus, the government cannot 
avoid paying awards by settling cases prior to a judgment against the defendant). 
 56. See id. (providing that the size of the whistleblower-employer’s award is 
determined based on the aggregate monetary sanctions imposed on the violative 
employer following a successful enforcement action).  
 57. See id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B) (stipulating that the Commission is not to consider 
the balance of the payout fund). 
 58. Id. § 78u-6(i). 
 59. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). 
 60. See id. § 78u-6(d)(1)–(2), (h) (providing that a whistleblower-employee, 
who seeks to remain anonymous, may instead be represented by counsel, so long 
as the employee submits probative information for his claim; Section 78u-(h) 
provides that the Commission may not disclose information that would reveal the 
identity of an anonymous whistleblower-employee, except in specific enumerated 
circumstances, in which disclosure is mandatory as part of an official public 
proceeding). 
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provide the Commission with original information through counsel, 
though counsel will be required to reveal the client’s identity prior to 
the disbursement of any award.61 The legislation also includes strict 
confidentiality requirements and reinstatement, twice back-pay, as 
well as costs of litigation for any whistleblower who experiences 
retaliatory behavior.62 
In August 2011, final regulations issued by the SEC took effect 
and clarified some of the legislation’s provisions.63 Importantly, the 
regulations do not require whistleblower-employees to report 
information through their company’s internal compliance system 
before disclosing it to the SEC.64 The regulations do, however, 
incentivize internal reporting by providing the SEC with discretion to 
consider the use of such procedures in determining award amounts.65 
The business lobby continues to push for the use of internal 
compliance procedures to be required, and on May 11, 2011, 
Congressman Michael Grimm (R-NY) introduced legislation to 
codify that policy.66 
The regulations also define “original information” and 
 
 61. Id. § 78u-6(d)(1)–(2) (providing that if whistleblower-employees wish to 
remain anonymous, they must be represented by counsel). 
 62. Id. § 78u-6(h) (providing that a whistleblower-employee must bring an 
employer retaliation claim within six years after the violative act occurred, or 
within three years after the basis for his claim becomes known, or reasonably 
should have been known).  
 63. See generally Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 34300, 34300–84 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249) 
(establishing the compliance dates for the finalized rules applicable to the Dodd-
Frank Act). 
 64. See John W. White et al., SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Rules, 
CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE (May 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/3288716_1.pdf 
(commenting that whistleblower-employees are now required to disclose the 
information to the SEC within a 120-day window of reporting the violation via 
internal mechanisms). 
 65. Id. at 2 (declaring that whistleblower-employees under the Dodd-Frank Act 
now may circumvent their company’s internal compliance system by bringing their 
claims privately; moreover, the SEC may enforce the Act’s anti-retaliation 
protections if the whistleblower-employee is discharged or discriminated against as 
the result of coming forward); see also 76 Fed. Reg. at 34322 (providing that 
where an FCPA action leads to multiple whistleblower claimants, the Commission 
will consider several factors listed in the final regulations to determine the 
appropriate allocation of the award). 
 66. See White, supra note 64, at 3. 
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“information that leads to successful enforcement.” Original 
information must be derived from the whistleblower’s independent 
knowledge and analysis and, intuitively, must not already be known 
by the SEC.67 The definition generally excludes information held by 
officers, directors, auditors, and lawyers who obtained it while 
performing internal investigations, though these individuals can 
provide information from internal investigations in limited 
circumstances.68 Information leading to a successful action must be 
specific, credible, and timely and must have some effect on the 
Commission’s investigative efforts.69 That is, it either must cause the 
staff to start or reopen an FCPA action, pursue a new channel in an 
ongoing investigation, or significantly contribute to an ongoing 
investigation.70 If an individual whistleblower provides information 
satisfying one of these criteria to his company and, after an internal 
investigation, the company ultimately discloses the information to 
the SEC, then the whistleblower will have preserved his “place in 
line” and will be eligible for compensation.71 
The FCPA amendments have already had an effect on the fight 
against global corruption: the quantity and quality of tips has 
increased since Dodd-Frank’s enactment.72 Time will tell whether 
 
 67. See 76 Fed. Reg. at 34310–11 (providing that original information must not 
arise from allegations made during judicial or administrative hearings, government 
sources, or the media reports, unless the whistleblower-employee is the source of 
such allegations). 
 68. Id. at 34318–19 (including situations in which (1) the individual reasonably 
believes reporting is necessary to prevent substantial harm to the corporation or its 
investors, (2) the individual reasonably believes his company is attempting to 
impede the internal investigation, or (3) the individual has reported the information 
to his company and the company has failed to take action after 120 days).  
 69. See White, supra note 64 (commenting that original information must 
“sufficiently contribute” to the success of actions currently being enforced, or 
under investigation). 
 70. Id. (noting that the final SEC rules were designed to create added 
incentives for whistleblower-employees to take action via internal mechanisms).  
 71. Id. at 3 (commenting that the increasingly costly financial incentives under 
the Dodd-Frank Act should motivate companies to improve their own internal 
compliance mechanisms and investigation procedures).  
 72. Id. at 1 (observing that the number of whistleblower reports submitted to 
the SEC has substantially increased since the Dodd-Frank Act became law). But 
see Mike Koehler, The Financial Reform Bill’s Whistleblower Provisions and the 
FCPA, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 20, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-
financial-reform-bills-whistleblower-provisions-and-the-fcpa (predicting that the 
new whistleblower provisions would have a negligible impact on FCPA 
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FCPA prosecutions and settlements will improve correspondingly. 
III. CONVINCING AND ALLOWING PRIVATE 
INDIVIDUALS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION 
Plagued by financial scandals and the influence of money in 
politics, in 2010 the United States slipped out of Transparency 
International’s list of the top twenty least corrupt countries. It fell to 
twenty-second place behind, among others, Canada (6), Barbados 
(17), and Chile (21).73 That said, FCPA enforcement has recently 
become a high priority for the Administration, Department of Justice, 
and SEC.74 In December 2008 and February 2009, the government 
secured penalties of $800 million and $579 million in two cases.75 
Then, in January 2010, the SEC formed an FCPA Specialty Unit, 
with instructions to start using cooperative agreements and 
agreements not to prosecute to encourage individuals to help the 
Commission gather information.76 Around the same time, the 
Department of Justice increased its FCPA staff, and twenty-two 
FCPA-related arrests were made at a Las Vegas trade show.77 
Moreover, eight of the top ten settlements in FCPA history occurred 
in 2010, and eight companies paid a total of $1.6 billion in 
penalties.78 The government also increased the number of actions it 
 
enforcement); Mike Koehler, Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-63 (pointing out that “[o]f the 3,001 
whistleblower tips received by the SEC in FY2012, 3.8% (115) related to the 
FCPA [and] in FY2011 (a partial reporting year) 3.9% of the 334 tips received by 
the SEC related to the FCPA”). 
 73. See Dave Graham, U.S. Slips to Historic Low in Global Corruption Index, 
REUTERS, Oct. 26, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/26/us-corruption-
transparency-idUSTRE69P0X620101026. 
 74. Fredric D. Firestone & Michael A. Ungar, DOJ and SEC Will Significantly 
Increase FCPA Enforcement Efforts, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Mar. 11, 
2012), http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/ 
c2bea4e1-2573-4e83-b0bf-8086e0001d96.cfm.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (reporting that the twenty-two arrests concerned executives and 
employees in the defense and law enforcement products industry). 
 78. See Andrew Longstreth, Fight Brews over Anti-Bribery Laws as Fines 
Jump, REUTERS, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/us-
fcpa-lobbying-idUSTRE78E7JK20110915 (noting that for the first twenty years of 
its history, the FCPA was rarely if ever enforced, but has seen a boom in recent 
years); see also 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 2–3 
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initiated: 2010 saw an eighty-five percent increase year-on-year in 
the number of actions.79 
A. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM AND THE FIGHT AGAINST 
CORRUPTION 
Changes made to the FCPA highlight the federal government’s 
increased focus on the fight against global corruption. By possibly 
solving the collective action problem, Dodd-Frank provides private 
individuals with a reason and a financial incentive to take action 
against global corruption. The amendments potentially allow a 
person to “do good and do well.” In so doing, it also solves, or at 
least lessens, the information inequalities that hamper government 
efforts, thus expanding the fight against impunity and making it more 
efficient. Because Dodd-Frank helps solve the collective action 
problem, private individuals are able to get involved in the fight, 
meaning that global corruption may actually start to decrease. 
In many ways, the government’s anti-corruption efforts have been 
inhibited by opportunity costs and information inequalities. The 
Dodd-Frank amendments have the potential to mitigate both. Even 
with a high percentage of companies willing to cooperate with 
authorities, FCPA investigations are costly.80 Investigations require a 
serious investment of U.S. taxpayer-sponsored treasure and man-
hours, possibly years, before any benefit is reaped.81 More 
importantly, investigations are economically costly, as resources 
 
(Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/ 
2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf [hereinafter 2010 FCPA Update] (explaining the 
number of enforcement actions in 2010 reached a record high of seventy-four 
actions brought by the Department of Justice and the SEC, eclipsing the previous 
high of thirty-eight actions in 2007). 
 79. See 2010 FCPA Update, supra note 78, at 3 (explaining that the dramatic 
increase in enforcement actions over the past decade may be attributed to increases 
in departmental resources allocated to FCPA enforcement at the DOJ and SEC, as 
well as the enactment of several key pieces of legislation).  
 80. See Thomas Fox, Top Ten FCPA Investigations of 2010, INFOSEC ISLAND 
(Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/10663-Top-Ten-FCPA-
Investigations-of-2010.html (arguing that there are no statistics available on how 
much it costs the government to run an FCPA investigation, but there are good 
statistics suggesting that private corporations running internal investigations spend 
millions of dollars on them).  
 81. Id. (inferring that these two examples are on the higher end, but they 
demonstrate the financial demands of conducting FCPA investigations). 
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devoted to one investigation cannot be devoted to another. This 
opportunity cost is a major inhibition on effectively combating 
global corruption, especially in an era when government resources 
are stretched to the limit and potential violators know there is a lower 
risk of being caught.82 
The fight has also suffered from information inequalities that 
make investigations lengthier, more costly, and less likely to 
succeed. Corporate insiders and employees are the most likely to be 
aware of FCPA violations—whether through general corporate 
knowledge, personal knowledge, or internal compliance and 
reporting mechanisms—but are, for reasons discussed below, the 
least likely to share that information with the government. Thus, the 
SEC and DOJ are often forced to initiate costly investigations with 
incomplete information.83 This undoubtedly leads to either longer, 
more costly investigations, unnecessary investigations, or 
investigations that are stopped prematurely due to lack of evidence. 
The information inequality is exacerbated by the collective action 
problem, which impedes individuals from cooperating with the 
government to fight corruption. Consider an employee at a 
multinational corporation with original information about her 
employer’s FCPA violations.84 Such an employee would be unlikely 
to disclose her information to the federal government for fear of 
 
 82. See FCPA and FCA Backlogs and the DOJ Elephant in the Room, 
MCGRATH & GRACE, LTD., http://mcgrathgrace.com/component/content/article/9-
blog/84-fcpa-and-fca-backlogs-and-the-doj-elephant-in-the-room.html (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2013) (observing that the DOJ’s limited resources are being stretched thin 
by the increasingly high volume of FCPA and FCA actions, causing government 
fraud investigations to last up to two years).  
 83. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, Investigation 
of Halliburton Co./TSKJ’s Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the 
Current Anti-Corruption Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 504 (2006) (detailing the 
expansive scope of the investigation of a Halliburton subsidiary in Nigeria, which 
started as a French government-led probe into minor allegations of fraud and 
rapidly developed into a major SEC investigation).  
 84. See William McLucas et al., Get Ahead of the Bus or Be Hit by the Bus: 
Practical Strategies for Mitigating the Risks of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Program, 44 BLOOMBERG BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1, 3 (noting that the cost 
calculation would be similar for individual, rather than corporate actors, though the 
potential costs would be more social and less economic—that is, individual actors 
would likely be less concerned with employment retaliation and potentially more 
concerned with social retaliation). 
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serious reprisals. Her employer could fire her, or, alternatively, could 
reassign her into oblivion and encourage her to quit. She could be 
blackballed from her chosen industry and could risk becoming a 
social pariah as a “snitch.” 
Unlike these concentrated potential costs, the benefits of the 
employee’s information disclosure would be widely disbursed, and 
she would likely receive little, if any, of the benefit of her own 
actions. To the extent that less global corruption means lower costs 
of doing business, prices of goods would decrease, but those benefits 
would be distributed between consumers worldwide. Profits would 
increase, but those benefits would be distributed between investors 
worldwide. Thus, if the employee is neither an investor nor a 
consumer, she would receive essentially none of the benefits of her 
actions. For example, if an American employee’s contribution to the 
fight against global corruption were to lead to a more transparent 
contracting process for Russian infrastructure, she would likely 
receive no benefit. The concentrated costs and disbursed benefits of 
providing corruption tips create a strong disincentive for private 
individuals to cooperate freely with the government.85 Even if 
potential whistleblowers would receive a general, societal benefit 
from decreased corruption, they would still likely be dissuaded from 
acting because of the possible preference to be free-riders and wait 
for someone else to take action.86 
But Dodd-Frank takes an unprecedented step to increase the power 
of the global fight against corruption by providing private actors with 
an incentive and a means to contribute. The fight against corruption 
has, until now, been carried out by states and intergovernmental 
organizations rather than by private individuals.87 Non-governmental 
 
 85. But see Chinyere Ajanwachuku, Comment, An In-House Counsel’s 
Decision to Whistleblow, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 379, 399 (2012) 
(demonstrating that a whistleblower-employee will decide to report violations 
based on a variety of factors ranging from financial incentives to a perceived 
ethical obligation to clients).  
 86. See Mark Pieth, Collective Action and Corruption 14 (Basel Inst. on 
Governance, Working Paper, No. 13, 2013), available at http://www.collective-
action.com/sites/default/files/120915_WP%2013_Collective%20Action%20and%
20corruption_Pieth_final.pdf (arguing that the collective action problem may deter 
employees from reporting violations, even if it is foreseeable that law enforcement 
will eventually crack down on their companies, whether they take action or not).  
 87. White, supra note 64, at 1 (commenting on the increasing prevalence of 
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organizations have also contributed to the fight as watchdogs and 
informers, but they have little ability to directly deter corruption.88 
Dodd-Frank is, therefore, fairly unprecedented because it 
incentivizes private individuals to contribute to an area that has 
traditionally been state-controlled. The FCPA still contains no 
private cause of action, but the recent amendments nevertheless 
provide a substantial means for private involvement in and influence 
over state actions.89 
The amendments take this unprecedented step not by adding a new 
avenue for private participation—though presumably, private 
individuals could always have disclosed information to the 
government—but by adding an incentive that had been lacking. The 
“new FCPA” effectively counters the collective action problem by 
both reducing the concentrated costs of taking action and 
consolidating the expected benefits. Whereas previously, a 
whistleblower bore the serious financial risk of retaliation, now he 
bears only the social costs. Although the Dodd-Frank retaliation 
protections are not a guarantee against retaliation or of full 
compensation, the provision of reinstatement, twice back-pay, and 
litigation costs should decrease and distribute the risks of taking 
action. 
In addition, the new FCPA significantly consolidates the benefits 
that private actors can expect to gain from their work. A 
whistleblower with valuable information can still expect to gain the 
general benefits of reduced global corruption that he always could, 
but additionally, he or she can expect to receive thousands or 
millions of dollars for his efforts. As described above, recent 
 
individual whistleblowers in state and inter-governmental enforcement actions). 
 88. See Kathleen M. Hamann et. al., Developments in U.S. and International 
Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 40 INT’L LAW. 417, 428–30 (2006) (non-
governmental organizations may design non-compliance policies, monitor fraud 
investigations, and oversee the implementation of national and international 
initiatives; however, they generally react responsively, rather than preemptively, to 
instances of corruption).  
 89. Pieth, supra note 86, at 14 (noting that the United States’ model of solving 
the collective action problem to greatly increase the resources available to fighting 
grand corruption has the potential to be expanded and implemented in other 
countries). The basic approach of seeking to decrease the free-rider problem by 
solving the collective action problem will provide a general strategy for other 
countries, which can tailor their specific approach to conditions on the ground. 
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settlements and penalties have ranged from the hundreds of millions 
to billions of dollars; a whistleblower receiving ten to thirty percent 
of such a sanction will have his risks and costs more than 
compensated. Dodd-Frank should, therefore, largely nullify the 
collective action problem and encourage individual actors to join the 
fight against global corruption.90 
B. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND FCPA LOBBYING 
The increase in FCPA enforcement has led to the formation of a 
powerful lobby against certain aspects of the Act. For example, 
looking forward, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce plans to reshape its 
agenda to make changing the FCPA one of its top priorities.91 
Lobbying by business groups has intensified, as they claim that the 
Act is an economic drag, which hurts American competitiveness.92 
Human rights and anti-corruption-related lobby groups have 
countered that fighting corruption actually decreases the costs of 
doing business.93 In March 2012, perhaps in response to the intense 
lobbying effort of business groups, the DOJ compromised with 
business groups and agreed to issue more guidance on the law.94 
By possibly countering the collective action problem, Dodd-Frank 
may have also readjusted the balance of costs and benefits in the 
 
 90. The more pressing question now may be whether the amendments swing 
the pendulum of the collective action problem too far, encouraging individuals to 
report too many violations too often, thereby reducing the effectiveness of internal 
compliance procedures; if individual awards are not balanced, it could increase the 
incidence of false positives and drive up costs to consumers as companies attempt 
to create insurance policies against huge sanctions.  
 91. Longstreth, supra note 78 (demonstrating that increased usage of the FCPA 
in federal prosecutions has prompted legislators to reassess its viability in light of 
the current economic landscape).  
 92. Id. (explaining how business lobbyists argue that foreign companies do not 
encounter the same legal hurdles as other companies, which fall under the FCPA’s 
purview). 
 93. See id. (observing that anti-corruption and human rights activists are 
anxious that the Chamber of Commerce’s proposed amendments may lessen the 
bite of the FCPA). 
 94. See Basil Katz, DOJ Official, US Chamber, to Discuss Enforcement of 
Bribery Law, REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/16 
/fcpa-guidance-idUSL2E8EGEQ720120316 (remarking that both the Chamber of 
Commerce and several senators have argued for incorporating greater clarity and 
consistency into the FCPA to illustrate how the law will be enforced in practice). 
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lobbying process—as described in the public choice theory.95 The 
costs of anti-corruption legislation are greatly concentrated on 
multinational corporations, while the benefits are widely disbursed 
among the consumer and investor class.96 Accordingly, businesses 
have a strong incentive to lobby the government for a weaker FCPA 
or at least weaker enforcement of a strong FCPA, or more clear 
guidelines of a strong FCPA.97 Individual actors have a weak 
incentive to take any action in favor of a strong FCPA because they 
are not likely to be adequately compensated for their work. 
However, Dodd-Frank has changed the public choice theory 
balance by providing individuals with a strong monetary incentive to 
take action in favor of strong anti-corruption legislation. By 
concentrating and increasing the potential benefits of fighting 
corruption, Dodd-Frank may actually strengthen the anti-corruption 
lobby. In essence, Dodd-Frank has strengthened the fight against 
global corruption not only by encouraging individuals to take part in 
the fight but also by encouraging public interest groups to support a 
strong legal framework. Time will tell if corporate groups embrace 
this change and contribute greater resources and attention to 
compliance officers and their anti-corruption programs. 
C. USING SEC DISCRETION TO MAINTAIN A BALANCE OF 
INTERESTS UNDER THE NEW FCPA 
Individual actors’ ability to affect the fight against corruption 
under the new FCPA is not unfettered. The largest limit on private 
action in FCPA cases is the SEC’s complete discretion over 
prosecuting actions and determining award amounts.98 That 
 
 95. See Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities 
Market, 91 N.C. L. REV. 745, 779–80 (2013) (remarking that the Dodd-Frank Act 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were both passed during politically dynamic, yet 
turbulent economic periods, contrary to traditional public choice theory, which 
states that laws and regulations are enacted as the result of the rational choices of 
actors in the financial marketplace). 
 96. See id. at 782 (noting that before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, the 
political power of corporate interest groups, like the Chamber of Commerce, began 
to steadily ebb, creating space for unions, consumers, and other public interest 
groups to assert themselves).  
 97. See id. at 792 (remarking that businesses may be more successful at 
lobbying for changes in legislation after public interest in promoting economic 
reform has declined).  
 98. See 12 U.S.C. § 922(a)(a)(5), (b)(1) (providing that the amount of award 
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discretion is essential to maintaining the effectiveness of the new 
framework. 
If whistleblowers are widely seen as gaining windfall profits from 
the pain of corporate shareholders, their peers may begin to search 
for and report evidence of potential corruption, regardless of its 
frivolity. Such behavior wastes government resources and does little, 
if anything, to further the global fight against corruption; indeed, it 
could actually impair the fight. Accordingly, complete SEC 
discretion is required to ensure whistleblowing awards are meted out 
fairly and in the manner least likely to cause false positives. 
SEC discretion over FCPA actions also allows the government to 
maintain control over its foreign policy objectives. FCPA actions 
have undoubtedly impacted foreign policy in the past, but there was 
little chance that the public could become involved in the action. The 
Dodd-Frank amendments increased the likelihood of public 
involvement and should thus increase the number of actions 
brought.99 That increase could make the Act’s effect on foreign 
policy more salient because suits against foreign companies or 
accusations of U.S. allies having corrupt government officials could 
disrupt American relations abroad. 
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) creates a similar risk of disrupting 
international affairs, but the State Department has countered that risk 
by adopting a protocol of submitting letters to district courts involved 
in ATS cases and asking them to dismiss the actions if they are 
potentially harmful to foreign relations.100 The authors are unaware 
of any State Department protocol requiring consultation with the 
 
conferred will also be affected by the amount of sanctions obtained by regulatory 
government agencies through related enforcement actions).  
 99. See Mike Delikat, Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower Bounty Provisions: The 
First Wave of Tips Filed with the SEC and What Public Companies Should Do 
Now, 2012 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMPL. L. EVENT REP. 2, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2012/03/national_c
onference_on_equal_employment_opportunity_law/mw2012eeo_delikat.authchec
kdam.pdf (pointing out that the number of whistleblower tips will likely increase 
as the Dodd-Frank Act’s award program gains more attention).  
 100. Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 695 (2004) (noting that “the 
potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of recognizing 
private causes of action for violating international law should make courts 
particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches in managing foreign affairs”). 
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SEC or DOJ prior to the initiation of FCPA actions. However, we 
would not be surprised if such a process existed informally or if one 
develops following the impending surge in FCPA tips and actions. 
Nevertheless, Commission discretion allows the government to gain 
resources under the new FCPA without completely ceding power 
over foreign relations to private actors. 
IV. APPLICATION TO MYANMAR AND 
CONCLUSION 
The FCPA is part of the United States’ securities regulation 
infrastructure, and is implemented by a large bureaucracy in the SEC 
and DOJ. Quite the opposite of the United States, Myanmar is in the 
early stages of creating a regulatory framework and civil service; it 
would, accordingly, be difficult and prohibitively costly for the 
country to create and effectively implement an anti-corruption 
framework on the scale of Dodd-Frank. This paper does not argue 
that Myanmar should implement the Dodd-Frank framework as 
constructed in the United States. Instead, it argues that the broad 
model presented by Dodd-Frank—one in which individual citizens 
are rewarded for whistleblower efforts (and, accordingly, one that 
solves the collective action problem)—provides a starting point for 
leaders in Myanmar seeking to reduce and eliminate corruption. 
Given the cost and time necessary to create a large-scale civil 
service, Myanmar’s government may find it more efficient to run its 
anti-corruption efforts though its judiciary, whereas the Dodd-Frank 
framework is run largely through the executive branch. Some 
bureaucracy will likely be needed to protect against overreaching by 
private citizens and to represent the government’s interest in anti-
corruption investigations and lawsuits. 
The judicial system in Myanmar is, like the rest of the government 
institutions, limited. The government may, nevertheless, find it easier 
to reform the judiciary—which will likely itself involve anti-
corruption efforts—and create a small executive agency to lead its 
anti-corruption efforts under the Dodd-Frank model, as opposed to 
creating agencies on the scale of the SEC and the DOJ. Again, 
Myanmar should focus not on the specifics of the Dodd-Frank 
framework, but on the notion that involving and incentivizing private 
citizens, who are often the ones paying the costs of corruption, in the 
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fight against corruption can make that fight more effective, shorter 
and, ultimately, less costly to the state. 
If the United States believes that its model for fighting corruption 
has the potential to be implemented around the world—and to 
change the way we fight corruption around the world (which would 
further the United States’ own social and economic foreign policy 
goals)—it would be wise to work with Myanmar, a country that is 
rapidly changing, especially as it emerges from a cash-based 
economy to part of the global financial banking system. Indeed, the 
country may be the United States’ best shot at testing its new regime 
in the developing world, and that shot comes at a time when the 
world is watching Myanmar’s every move, as the recent decision to 
host the World Economic Forum there made clear. 
Myanmar’s fledgling democracy has recently shown its 
willingness to make drastic changes in a country mired in 
authoritarianism and corruption. The election of Aung San Suu Kyi 
trained the world’s eyes on Myanmar, making it potentially this 
decade’s success story. If the country continues to root out 
bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, investors will likely flood it 
with money. A legal framework similar to the FCPA could create 
buy-in from citizens and incentivize their efforts to end corruption in 
a country where, to some, extreme poverty makes corruption seem, 
rightly or wrongly, like the least of the people’s problems. And if an 
FCPA-type regime proves successful in Myanmar, at a time when so 
many people are watching the country, it could revolutionize the way 
we fight corruption in the developing world. 
 
